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1. Introduction
The study of preferences in the presence of risks with unknown
probability distribution (also known as second-order risk, Knightian
uncertainty or ambiguity) has been a very active area of research in
recent decades. Interest in axiomatising such preferences goes back at
least to the seminal paper by Ellsberg [6]; since then, various authors
have proposed axiomatisations of increasing generality, in particular
Gilboa and Schmeidler [12], Föllmer and Schied [8, 9] as well as
Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University, Universitätsstraße
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Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy, Ludwig Maximilian University of
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Maccheroni, Marinacci and Rustichini [23]. Recently, even game-
theoretic aspects of ambiguity have been studied, for example by Riedel
and Sass [24] and Kuzmics [19].
An even greater level of generality was recently achieved by Cerreia-
Vioglio, Ghirardato, Maccheroni, Marinacci and Siniscalchi [4] with
their proposal of axiomatising preferences in the presence of ambiguity
as Monotonic Bernoullian Archimedean (MBA) preferences and their
extensive study of the same. The MBA axiomatisation is distinguished
by a comparatively low complexity, as measured by the number of
quantifier alternations, which is the common complexity measure for
formulae in mathematical logic.
The present paper is concerned with the question whether rational
aggregation, in the sense of Arrovian social choice theory, of such
preferences is possible. One consequence of the comparatively low
complexity of the axiomatisation by Cerreia-Vioglio, Ghirardato,
Maccheroni, Marinacci and Siniscalchi [4] is that said question can
be answered relatively quickly and comprehensively using tools from
model theory (a branch of mathematical logic): Based on the
model-theoretic approach to abstract aggregation theory pioneered by
Lauwers and Van Liedekerke [20] and more recently further developed
by Herzberg and Eckert [16, 17], we prove that under some standard
assumptions (a strong version of the independence axiom, the Pareto
principle, and conditions ensuring the richness of the domain), non-
dictatorial Arrovian aggregation of MBA preferences is not possible,
neither for finite nor (unlike in the case of allowing more general
preferences, cf. Campbell [3]) infinite populations. While this proof
methodology presently requires the set of states of the world to be
finite, there is some hope that the use of infinitary model theory (cf.
e.g. Keisler [18]) might eventually provide the means to overcome this
limitation.
Of course, an obvious positive way to respond to Arrovian
impossibility results, such as those contained in the present paper,
is to drop the aggregator desideratum of independence of irrelevant
alternatives or neutrality/systematicity. The resulting problem of mere
Paretian aggregation is usually analytically more tractable. However,
even Paretian aggregation is impossible for finite profiles of generalised
expected-utility preferences, as discussed by several authors, including
relatively recently Gajdos, Tallon and Vergnaud [10]. The main
contribution of the present paper is the consideration of the case of
infinite populations (featured, for example, in macroeconomics).
The structure of this paper is as follows. We review Montonic
Bernoullian Archimedean preferences in Section 2, motivate the
aggregation problem for MBA preferences in Section 3, formally state
the formal results in Section 4 and conclude with a brief discussion in
Section 5. The proofs of the main results are contained in Section 6.
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2. Monotonic Bernoullian Archimedean (MBA) preferences
In the following, we briefly describe the axiomatisation of
Monotonic Bernoullian Archimedean (MBA) preferences as well as
the main representation theorem of Cerreia-Vioglio, Ghirardato,
Maccheroni, Marinacci and Siniscalchi [4]. Herein, as was already
pointed out in the introduction, we have to confine ourselves presently
(for technical reasons) to the special case where there are only finitely
many states of the world. The framework is along the lines of Anscombe
and Aumann [1].
Let S (the set of states of the world) be a finite set. LetX (the set of
consequences) be a convex subset, with at least two distinct elements,
of an arbitrary vector space. An act is a function f : S → X. The
mixture of two acts is defined in the obvious way: For all α ∈ [0, 1]
and f, g : S → X, the mixture αf + (1 − α)g is defined point-wise as
s 7→ αf(s)+(1−α)g(s). (This is again an act as X is convex.) Clearly,
any element x ∈ X can itself be viewed as an act, viz. the constant act
s 7→ x.
MBA preferences are special preference relations among acts:
Definition 1. Consider a binary relation % on XS with symmetric
part ∼ and asymmetric part . The relation % is called a Monotonic,
Bernoullian and Archimedean (MBA) preference relation if and only if
it satisfies all of the following:
(1) % is non-trivial,1 complete and transitive;
(2) for all acts f, g, if f(s) % g(s) for all s ∈ S, then f % g
(Monotonicity Axiom);
(3) for all x, y, z ∈ X and λ ∈ (0, 1], if x  y, then λx+(1−λ)z 
λy + (1− λ)z (Bernoullian or Risk Independence Axiom);
(4) for all acts f, g, h, if f  g  h, then there exist α, β ∈ (0, 1)
such that αf + (1− α)h  g  βf + (1 − β)h (Continuity or
Archimedean Axiom).
MBA preferences admit a beautiful representation theorem
(Cerreia-Vioglio, Ghirardato, Maccheroni, Marinacci and Siniscalchi
[4, Proposition 1]) that substantially generalises the well-known
representation theorems for maxmin expected-utility preferences (cf.
Gilboa and Schmeidler [12]) or variational preferences (cf. Maccheroni,
Marinacci and Rustichini [23]). This representation theorem (and to
some extent also its predecessors) requires the notion of monotonic
normalised continuous functionals. Let Γ be an interval ⊆ R, and
consider a functional I : ΓS → R. We call I monotonic if and only if
I(a) ≤ I(b) whenever a ≤ b (point-wise on S); I is called normalised if
and only if I maps the constant function s 7→ α to α for all α ∈ Γ. In
light of the norm equivalence on finite-dimensional vector spaces, the
1In the sense that not for all acts f, g, f % g.
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map I is called continuous if it is continuous with respect to any norm
on the finite-dimensional RS ⊇ ΓS, e.g. the Euclidean norm.
Theorem 2 (Cerreia-Vioglio et al.). A binary relation % on XS
is an MBA preference relation if and only if there exist a non-constant
affine function u : X → R and a monotonic, normalised, continuous
functional I : u[X]S → R such that for all f, g : S → X,
f % g ⇔ I(u ◦ f) ≥ I(u ◦ g).
The function u and the functional I are unique up to affine monotone
transformation.
An MBA preference relation % is an expected-utility preference
relation if there exists some probability measure p : 2S → [0, 1]
and some non-constant affine function u : X → R such that for all
f, g : S → X,
f % g ⇔
∫
u ◦ f dp ≥
∫
u ◦ g dp.
Let henceforth Q denote the set of all expected-utility preference
relations.
3. The question of Arrovian aggregation of MBA preferences
Moving to the aggregate level, consider a population in which
all individuals rank their available acts under ambiguity according
to MBA preference relations. One may ask: Is it possible to merge
(‘aggregate’) these preferences into a single MBA preference relation,
in a way that respects certain responsiveness axioms? Put slightly
differently: Is there a rational mechanism, other than dictatorship, by
which a population of individuals holding MBA preferences can agree
on a single aggregate MBA preference ordering? If the answer were
affirmative, this would, for instance, entail a microeconomic foundation
for the macroeconomic use of MBA preferences at the aggregate level,
e.g. multiplier preferences (cf. Hansen and Sargent [13]) employed by
a social planner.
If one employs responsiveness axioms that are derived from
Arrovian social choice theory and restricts oneself to finite populations
only, one may expect the answer to be negative, on account of Arrow’s
[2] impossibility theorem. For the case of infinite populations —
which has some potential interest for microfoundations in light of
the continua-of-agents models used in macroeconomics —, one may
hope that such an aggregation is feasible, on account of Fishburn’s [7]
possibility theorem.
As it turns out, however, the Archimedean axiom moves the
problem towards the setting of Campbell’s [3] impossibility theorem
for aggregating continuous preference relations. Thus, there is a rather
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general result about Arrovian aggregation of MBA preferences — but,
unfortunately, it is negative.
4. Arrovian aggregation of MBA preferences is impossible
In order to state the result, let us denote by P the set of MBA
preferences, and let us fix an arbitrary non-empty set N , henceforth
called the population. A typical element of PN (profile) will be denoted
by P = (Pi)i∈N . Whenever P is a preference ordering, we write P for
its asymmetric part.
Let us introduce the following terminology.
• An aggregator of Montonic Bernoullian Archimedean
preferences (for short: MBA aggregator) is a map with
domain ⊆ PN and range ⊆ P.
• An MBA aggregator F is systematic if and only if for every P
in the domain of F and all f, f ′, g, g′ : S → X,
{i ∈ N : fPig} = {i ∈ N : f ′Pig′} ⇒ (fF (P )g ⇔ f ′F (P )g′).
• An MBA aggregator F is weakly Paretian if and only if for
every P in the domain of F and all f, g : S → X, if fPig for
all i ∈ N , then fF (P )g.
• An MBA aggregator F is Paretian if and only if it is weakly
Paretian and for every P in the domain of F and all f, g : S →
X, if fPi g for all i ∈ N , then fF (P )g.
• An MBA aggregator is dictatorial if and only if there exists
some dictator d ∈ N such that for every P in the domain of F
and all f, g : S → X,
fF (P )g ⇔ fPdg.
• An MBA aggregator F is universal if and only if its domain is
PN .
• An MBA aggregator is weakly universal if and only if there are
MBA preference relations %1,%2,%3 such that
(1) f %1 g, f ′ %1 g′, f %2 g, f ′ ≺2 g′, f ≺3 g, f ′ %3 g′ for
some acts f, f ′, g, g′, and
(2) the domain of F contains {%1,%2,%3}N .
• An MBA aggregator F is said to have a large domain if and
only if it is weakly universal, N is infinite and there exists a
profile (Pi)i∈N in its domain and some acts f, g, h such that
the set
{i ∈ N : fPi gPi h, (αf + (1− α)h)Pi gPi (βf + (1− β)h)}
is finite for all α, β ∈ (0, 1) and such that fF (P )gF (P )h.
The concepts weak universality and large domain are not common
and therefore require some explanation. Having a large domain means
being defined for rather unusual profiles. For example, a Paretian
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aggregator has a large domain if its domain contains a profile of MBA
preferences under which all individuals support the ranking f  g  h,
but the “perturbed” ranking αf + (1 − α)f  g  βh + (1 − β)h is
always rejected by all but finitely many individuals — no matter how
close α and β are chosen to 1 and 0, respectively. One might say
that such a profile fails to be equicontinuous at the acts f, g, h in a
rather strong sense viz. that not even one of its (infinite) subsequences
is equicontinuous.
For example, if N is countably infinite, then all Paretian MBA
aggregators whose domain comprises all profiles consisting of expected-
utility preferences have a large domain:
Remark 3. Suppose S contains at least three distinct elements, let
N be countably infinite and F be Paretian with domain ⊇ QN . Then
F has a large domain.
The notion of weak universality is well-chosen in the sense that
universality implies weak universality:
Remark 4. If S contains at least two distinct elements, then any
universal MBA aggregator is weakly universal.
Aggregators of expected-utility preferences are weakly universal:
Remark 5. If S contains at least two distinct elements, then any
MBA aggregator with domain ⊇ QN is weakly universal.
The main finding of this paper is the following impossibility result:
Proposition 6. Let F be a systematic and weakly Paretian
aggregator of Montonic Bernoullian Archimedean preferences.
(1) If N is finite and F is weakly universal, then F is dictatorial.
(2) If N is infinite and F has a large domain, then F is dictatorial.
In particular, this entails that non-dictatorial Paretian systematic
aggregation of expected-utility preferences is impossible, even for
(countably) infinite populations.
Corollary 7. Suppose S contains at least three distinct elements,
and let F be a systematic and weakly Paretian aggregator of Montonic
Bernoullian Archimedean preferences whose domain contains at least
all expected-utility preference profiles.
(1) If N is finite, then F is dictatorial.
(2) If N is countably infinite and F is even Paretian, then F is
dictatorial.
5. Discussion
The axiomatisation of preferences in the presence of ambiguity in
terms of MBA preferences by Cerreia-Vioglio et al. [4] is remarkable
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on account of its great mathematical generality and elegant, simple
logical form. The low degree of formal complexity permits the direct
application of an aggregation-theoretic methodology that employs tools
from mathematical logic. A relatively general impossibility theorem,
encompassing both finite and infinite electorates, follows.
Hence, the aggregation of MBA preferences cannot follow Arrovian
lines, not even on infinite populations. New avenues may open if
one significantly weakens or jettisons independence-like conditions
(such as the strong independence notion of systematicity — also
known as neutrality — in this paper): For the very special case of
von Neumann–Morgenstern preferences, it has long been known that
mere Paretian aggregation is possible even for finite electorates (cf.
Harsanyi [14]) while Arrovian aggregation is not (cf. Le Breton [21]).
The Paretian aggregation of a large class of preference relations,
including the Gilboa–Schmeidler maxmin expected-utility preferences,
has been investigated by Gilboa, Schmeidler and Samet [11], Chambers
and Hayashi [5] as well as Gajdos, Tallon and Vergnaud [10]. For the
case of finite electorates, their impossibility result is similar to ours
and even stronger as it dispenses of any independence or systematicity
conditions; however, they do not treat the infinite case, which is the
most important contribution of the present paper.
In any case, the cost thus abandoning an Arrovian approach to
aggregation theory is, as in the Harsanyi-inspired literature, is of course
that one leaves behind the most firmly established framework of social
choice theory. For example, one may very well question whether a mere
Paretian aggregate of MBA preference orderings should be seen as a
compelling microeconomic foundation of a macroeconomic use of MBA
preference relations at the aggregate level. In view of the impossibility
results of this paper, it appears unlikely that MBA preferences at the
aggregate level can be given a general microeconomic justification.
Analogous results have been obtained with similar methods for the
special case of variational preferences (cf. Herzberg [15]). However,
due to the simple and elegant axiomatisation of MBA preferences, the
proof of the impossibility result in this paper is much more appealing.
6. Proofs
Proof of Remark 3. Let N be countably infinite. Without loss
of generality, we may assume that N equals the set N of nonnegative
integers. Let s0, s1, s2 be three distinct elements of S and F Paretian
with domain ⊇ QN.
Let x0, x1 be two distinct elements of X. Let u : X → R be a
non-constant and affine function satisfying u(x1) = 1 and u(x0) = 0.
Let, for each k ∈ {0, 1, 2}, fk : S → X be such that fk(s) = x1 if s = sk
and fk(s) = x0 for s ∈ S \ {sk}, so that u ◦ fk(s) = 1 if s = sk and
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u ◦ f0 dpi, bi :=
∫
S
u ◦ f1 dpi, ci :=
∫
S
u ◦ f2 dpi.
Then, clearly,
ai = pi{s0}, bi = pi{s1}, ci = pi{s2}.
Let, for each i ∈ N, pi be chosen to be concentrated on {s0, s1, s2} and
such that
ai = pi{s0} = bi + 4−i−2, ci = pi{s2} = bi − 2−i−2,
whence
bi = pi{s1} = 1
3
(
1− 4−i−2 + 2−i−2) .
Then for all α ∈ (0, 1), one has the following chain of equivalences:
αai + (1− α)ci > bi ⇔ α(ai − bi) + (1− α)(ci − bi) > 0
⇔ 4−i−2α− 2−i−2(1− α) > 0⇔ α− 2i+2(1− α) > 0
⇔ α (1 + 2i+2) > 2i+2 ⇔ 2i+2
1 + 2i+2
< α,
and the last inequality can only hold for finitely many i ∈ N if α ∈ (0, 1)
since 2i+2
1+2i+2
−→ 1 as i→∞. Hence, the inequality
αai + (1− α)ci > bi
is only satisfied for finitely many i ∈ N. Moreover, clearly
ai > bi > ci
for every i ∈ N.
Now let P ∈ QN be the unique profile which satisfies for all i ∈ N




u ◦ h dpi ≥
∫
S
u ◦ h˜ dpi,
and put
f := f0, g := f1, h := f2.




(as ai > bi > ci) for all i ∈ N. Since F is Paretian, this implies
fF (P )gF (P )h.
Moreover, the individual preference ranking
(αf + (1− α)h)Pi g
(which is equivalent to αai + (1 − α)ci > bi) holds only for finitely
many i ∈ N whenever α ∈ (0, 1). Therefore, with P and f, g, h as
previously defined, the conditions in the definition of a large domain
are satisfied. 
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Proof of Remark 4. It is enough to construct %1,%2,%3∈ P
and f, g : S → X such that f ∼1 g, f 2 g and f ≺3 g. Then one can
simply put f ′ := g and g′ := f and PN satisfies the requirements on
the domain of a weakly universal aggregator.
The construction of such %1,%2,%3∈ P and f, g : S → X
is straightforward, thanks to the representation theorem of Cerreia-
Vioglio et al. [4, Propositions 1] (Theorem 2).
Let x0, x1 ∈ X be two distinct outcomes, and let u : X → R be a
non-constant affine function; without losing generality, u(x0) < u(x1).
Let s0, s1 ∈ S be distinct, too, and choose f, g such that f(s0) = x0,
f(s1) = x1, g(s0) = x1, g(s1) = x0. Let ∆(s0, s1) be the set of all
probability measures on S that are actually concentrated on {s0, s1},
and let us define I1, I2, I3 as follows:




I2 : a 7→ u(x1) + min
p∈∆(s0,s1)
∫
(a− u ◦ f) dp
I3 : a 7→ u(x1) + min
p∈∆(s0,s1)
∫
(a− u ◦ g) dp




u ◦ h dp = min
q∈[0,1]
(qu ◦ h(s0) + (1− q)u ◦ h(s1))
= u ◦ h(s1) + min
q∈[0,1]




−u ◦ h dp = min
q∈[0,1]
(−qu ◦ h(s0)− (1− q)u ◦ h(s1))
= −u ◦ h(s1) + min
q∈[0,1]
q (u ◦ h(s1)− u ◦ h(s0)) ,
which can be used to verify that I2, I3 are normalised (that I1 is
normalised and that all of them are continuous and monotonic is




u ◦ h dp−
∫





qu ◦ h(s0) + (1− q)u ◦ h(s1)− qu ◦ h˜(s0)− (1− q)u ◦ h˜(s1)
)





u ◦ h(s0)− u ◦ h˜(s0)− u ◦ h(s1) + u ◦ h˜(s1)
)
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From here, we can deduce for our above choices of f, g, exploiting
u(x0) < u(x1):
I1(u ◦ f) = u(x1) + u(x0)− u(x1) = u(x0)
I1(u ◦ g) = u(x0) + 0 = u(x0)
I2(u ◦ f) = u(x1) + 0 = u(x1)
I2(u ◦ g) = u(x1) + u(x0)− u(x1) + 0 = u(x0)
I3(u ◦ f) = u(x1) + u(x1)− u(x0) + 2 (u(x0)− u(x1)) = u(x0)
I3(u ◦ g) = u(x1) + 0 = u(x1)
Thus,
I1(u ◦ f) = I1(u ◦ g), I2(u ◦ f) > I2(u ◦ g), I3(u ◦ f) < I3(u ◦ g)
and therefore
f ∼1 g, f 2 g, f ≺3 g
if %1,%2,%3 are the preference relations represented by I1◦u, I2◦u, I3◦
u, respectively. 
Proof of Remark 5. As in the proof of Remark 4, it is sufficient
to construct expected-utility preferences %1,%2,%3 and f, g : S → X
such that f ∼1 g, f 2 g and f ≺3 g. Then one can simply put
f ′ := g and g′ := f and PN satisfies the requirements on the domain
of a weakly universal aggregator.
And again, the construction of such%1,%2,%3∈ P and f, g : S → X
is straightforward, thanks to the representation theorem of Cerreia-
Vioglio et al. [4, Propositions 1] (Theorem 2).
Let x0, x1 ∈ X be two distinct outcomes, and let u : X → R be a
non-constant affine function; without losing generality, u(x0) < u(x1).
Let s0, s1 ∈ S be distinct, too, and choose f, g such that f(s0) = x0,
f(s1) = x1, g(s0) = x1, g(s1) = x0. Let, for any s ∈ S, δs denote the
Dirac measure concentrated on s (i.e. for all A ∈ 2S, δs(A) = 1 if s ∈ A
and = 0 else). Let us define I1, I2, I3 as follows:








I2 : a 7→
∫
a dδs1 = a(s1)
I3 : a 7→
∫
a dδs0 = a(s0)
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Obviously then, I1, I2, I3 are monotonic, normalised and continuous.
Moreover, by our above choices of f, g, we obtain:
I1(u ◦ f) = u(x0) + u(x1)
2
, I1(u ◦ g) = u(x1) + u(x0)
2
I2(u ◦ f) = u(x1), I2(u ◦ g) = u(x0)
I3(u ◦ f) = u(x0), I3(u ◦ g) = u(x1)
Thus, exploiting our choice of u (viz. u(x0) < u(x1)),
I1(u ◦ f) = I1(u ◦ g), I2(u ◦ f) > I2(u ◦ g), I3(u ◦ f) < I3(u ◦ g)
and therefore
f ∼1 g, f 2 g, f ≺3 g
if %1,%2,%3 are the preference relations represented by I1◦u, I2◦u, I3◦
u, respectively. 
Proof of Proposition 6. For the proof of the main result,
a purely technical reformulation is required. The model-theoretic
approach to aggregation theory assumes that all relations involved are
defined on the same set, in our case the set of acts. This means, in
particular, that we need to find a way of viewing scalars weights as acts
and hence the mixture operator as a ternary operation on acts.
In order to achieve this, fix two distinct elements of x0, x1 ∈ X. For
each α ∈ [0, 1], we identify α with the constant act αx0+(1−α)x1. It is
easy to verify that αx0 +(1−α)x1 is invertible. Therefore, the mixture
operator can be viewed as mapping a triple — consisting of a constant
act of the form αx0 + (1− α)x1 and two other acts — to another act,
viz. the one defined by αf + (1− α)g. In addition, the definition of an
MBA preference relation invokes the notion of a constant act and of
the evaluation of an act at a certain state of the world s.
In this vein, all the axioms describing an MBA preference relation
can be formulated using
• the strict preference relation symbol (denoted by R in the
following),
• the predicate of being a constant act (denoted by C),
• the predicate of being an act of the form αx0 + (1 − α)x1
(denoted by I),
• for each state of the world s, the formal projection operator
pis that assigns to any act f the constant act f(s),
• the formal mixture operator m, whose interpretation is that
to any triple consisting of two acts f, g and an act of the form
αx0 + (1− α)x1 assigns αf + (1− α)g.
and the usual logical connectives and quantifiers of first-order predicate
logic.
For purely technical reasons we need to find a formalisation of
the Archimedean axiom which does not contain negations; therefore,
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the strict preference relation symbol has to be used as a fundamental
symbol. Since the preference orderings are assumed to be complete, we
can recover the weak preference relation P and the symmetric part Q
of P from R by introducing
fPg :≡ ¬gRp, fQg :≡ fPg ∧ gPf.
In this formalisation, the MBA preference axioms are either
universal, (i.e. of the form (∀f)(∀g)(∀h)ϕ where ϕ is quantifier-free)
or — in the case of the Archimedean axioms — universal-existential
(i.e. of the form (∀f)(∀g)(∀h)(∃f ′)(∃g′)φ where φ is quantifier-free. Of
course, any preference ordering P among acts gives rise to a first-order
structure — in the sense of model theory — whose domain is the set
of acts and which interprets R,C, I, (pi(s))s∈S ,m.
Using an extension, due to Herzberg and Eckert [17], of the
model-theoretic approach to aggregation theory originally pioneered
by Lauwers and Van Liedekerke [20], one can now prove that neither
for finite nor for infinite electorates, there can be any non-dictatorial
aggregators satisfying the conditions of the theorem. At the heart
of the proof in both cases are the following two crucial facts. First,
every weakly universal systematic weakly Paretian aggregator maps
any profile P in its domain to the restriction, to the set of acts, of the
ultraproduct of (the sequence of first-order structures obtained from)
P with respect to some ultrafilter DF [17, Lemma 3.5, Lemma 3.8].
Secondly, if an ultrafilter contains a finite set, it must be principal, i.e.
the system of supersets of some singleton — in other words, it must
be of the form {C ⊆ N : d ∈ C} for some d ∈ N . Therefore, if an
ultrafilter contains a finite set, one can infer that F is a dictatorship:
In order to verify that d is the dictator ruling under F , it is enough
to note that F is the ultraproduct construction with respect to DF
restricted to the set of acts (Herzberg and Eckert [17, Lemma 3.8]),
whence it follows that actually
F (P ′) = P ′d
for all profiles P ′ in its domain.
Hence, in order to prove the dictatorial nature of F , it is sufficient
to verify that indeed there is a finite subset of N among the elements
of the ultrafilter DF . In the case of a finite electorate, this is trivial,
because N ∈ DF by the definition of an ultrafilter and N is finite by
assumption.
In the case of an infinite electorate, more work and an additional
assumption in the guise of the above large domain condition is




Ia ∧ Ib ∧
(
(fRg ∧ gRh)→
(m(a, f, h)Rg ∧ gRm(b, f, h))
))
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Let us now fix acts f, g, h and a profile P as in the large domain
condition and consider the formula
φ[a, b] :≡ Ia ∧ Ib ∧ fRg ∧ gRh ∧m(a, f, h)Rg ∧ gRm(b, f, h),
which has the — from a model-theoretic vantage point rather nice
— property that it is free of universal quantifiers, negations and
disjunctions, which we shall exploit shortly.
If % is an arbitrary preference ordering, we shall write % |= φ[a, b]
(read: φ[a, b] holds for %) if and only if it holds when the asymmetric
part  of % is inserted for R in φ[a, b], in other words, if and only if
indeed a, b are acts of the form a = αx0+(1−α)x1, b = βx0+(1−β)x1
for α, β ∈ (0, 1) and
f  g  h, αf + (1− α)h  g  βf + (1− β)h.
Observe that for any preference ordering P that satisfies the
Archimedean Axiom as well as fPgPh, we have the existence of
some α, β ∈ (0, 1) such that
αf + (1− α)h  g  βf + (1− β)h.
In particular, in our new notation, this means that
(1) for all P ∈ P, if fPgPh, then for some a, b, P |= φ[a, b].
By Herzberg and Eckert [17, Lemma 3.8], the aggregate F (P )
of any profile P = (Pi)i∈N in the domain of F can be seen as the
restriction of the ultraproduct of P — more precisely: of the sequence
of formal structures corresponding to the Pi — to XS with respect to
some ultrafilter DF on N .
Combining this model-theoretic description of F (P ) with the fact
that φ[a, b] is free of universal quantifiers, negations and disjunctions,
the inductive proof (in formula complexity) of the fundamental theorem
on ultraproducts (Łoś’s theorem [22]) shows: for all a, b, F (P ) |= φ[a, b]
if and only if the collection of those i with Pi |= φ[a, b] is an element
of the ultrafilter DF . Now, by our observation (1), there must be
acts a, b such that F (P ) |= φ[a, b], because (i) F (P ) ∈ P (F being
an MBA aggregator) and (ii) our choice of f, g, h, P ensures that
fF (P )gF (P )h. It follows that indeed {i ∈ N : Pi |= φ[a, b]} ∈ DF
for some acts a, b.
On the other hand, by our choice of f, g, h and P as in the
large domain condition, the coalition {i ∈ N : Pi |= φ[a, b]} is actually
finite. Hence, we have shown that among the elements of DF there is
indeed a finite subset of N . As was explained before (when proving the
result for the finite case), this entails that (DF is principal and hence)
F is a dictatorship.

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